

An aerial photograph of a large industrial facility, likely an oil refinery or gas processing plant, situated on a waterfront. The facility features numerous storage tanks, distillation columns, and complex piping. A large green and white ship is docked at a long pier extending into the water. The surrounding area includes some greenery and parking lots.

HUMAN & ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS IN OIL AND GAS

DMP Forum, Perth

Martin Anderson: Manager Human
Factors 2017




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
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- + Where it all started (for me)
- + Six key concepts
- + Our approach


Where it all started (for me)



“different organisations doing similar work are known to have different safety records and certain specific factors in the organisation are related to safety”,

“Third Report: Organising for Safety”, ACSNI*
Human Factors Study Group, 1993

* Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations




Real data showing variation in safety performance across different facilities in an international organisation (not Woodside)

My UK HSE experience: Where do companies focus?



1. Engineering and hardware issues




... at the expense of human issues

2. Personal safety



flickr.com/photos/revgrant/13496315673/



... at the expense of process safety

3. Front-line staff

To err is human
To blame it on someone else is even more human!

... instead of those who design, lead and manage

"Be careful out there"




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SIX KEY CONCEPTS



Key concept 1: “Human error” is inevitable



Alan Levine: flickr.com/photos/cogdog/2715544998

“It is generally understood that virtually all major accidents include Human Factors among the root causes and that prevention of major accidents depends upon human reliability”

IOGP, Report 460, 2010


(IOGP - International Association of Oil and Gas Producers)

The challenge is to create human reliability

Key concept 2: Don't just focus on the last person to touch the equipment




Human & Organisational Factors analysis of Macondo



“The critical common element is an unwavering commitment to safety at the top of an organization: the CEO and board of directors must create the culture and establish the conditions under which everyone in a company shares responsibility for maintaining a relentless focus on preventing accidents”

Deep Water: Report to the President, 2011

A tale of two aviation incidents



Asiana airlines crash caused by pilot error and confusion, investigators say

Investigation into San Francisco crash concludes pilots 'did not fully understand' systems and had unhealthy cockpit culture



www.theguardian.com (Wednesday 25th June 2014)

Asiana Airlines flight 214 crash caused by Boeing planes being 'overly complicated'



www.independent.co.uk (Wednesday 25th June 2014)

“Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking”

(James Reason, *Human Error*, 1990)

Key concept 3: Human reliability can be influenced . . .



. . . by **Performance Shaping Factors**,
such as fatigue, workload, distractions


➤ **Human failures are not random!**

“People's actions are influenced by the organizations in which they work, shaping their choices in directions that even they may not realize”

NASA – Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board

“Although actions or errors by operations personnel at the BP Texas City site were immediate causes of the accident, numerous latent conditions and safety system deficiencies influenced their actions and contributed to the accident”

CSB, BP Texas City Investigation Report



What might influence Homer's behaviour?







Image credit: Martin Anderson

Key concept 4: Whose behaviours and decisions?



- + Front line staff often have little control over a range of influences:
 - Shift patterns
 - Competing demands
 - Staffing levels
 - Quality of contractors
 - Competence programme
 - Permit system
 - Layout of plant
 - Procedures
 - Distractions
 - Design of controls and displays
 - Handover arrangements
 - Clarity of roles and responsibilities
 - Quality of supervision
- + “Behavioural safety” does not equal “human factors”
- + *“Behavioural safety and major accident hazards: Magic bullet or shot in the dark?”*, (Anderson, 2004)

Key concept 5: Human factors can be applied proactively



[flickr.com/photos/pasukaru76/3998273279](https://www.flickr.com/photos/pasukaru76/3998273279)

- + Applying human factors to investigations is part of the picture. . .
- + . . . but what about applying human factors to incidents that haven't occurred yet?

Key concept 6: Defining human factors as a set of key topics




| |
|--|
| Optimising human performance |
| Design of equipment, processes, tasks & environment |
| Organisational change |
| Supervision |
| Staffing levels and workload |
| Training & competence |
| Procedures |
| Safety critical communications (including handovers, permits & alarms) |
| Fatigue & shiftwork |
| Organisational & safety culture |




Top 11 Human factors for WA mine sites, DMP, 2017

Key human factors topics in practice




| Key human factors topics | Examples: CSB investigation of BP Texas City |
|---|--|
| Optimising human performance | No proactive analysis of DCS issues. Issues in previous start-ups not investigated. |
| Design of equipment, processes, tasks and environment | Control system did not support operations personnel |
| Organisational change | Various changes not evaluated for their impact on the control of major hazards |
| Supervision | Ineffective supervisory oversight and technical assistance during unit start-up |
| Staffing levels and workload | Insufficient staffing to handle board operator workload during the high-risk time of unit start-up |
| Training and competence | Inadequate operator training for abnormal and start-up conditions |
| Procedures | Not up-to-date or accurate. Start-up procedure lacked sufficient instructions |
| Safety critical communications | No policy for effective shift communication |
| Fatigue and shiftwork | Unit operators were likely fatigued (e.g. 12-hour shifts, 29 days in a row) |
| Organisational and safety culture | A work environment that encouraged operations personnel to deviate from procedure |



BP Texas City refinery (2005). Images from U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (www.CSB.gov)

What if we don't address human factors?



- + Things take longer than they should . . .
- + Things have to be re-done . . .
- + People don't do what we expected (or hoped for) ...

- + . . . stuff gets out of the pipes, and we hurt:
 - + people
 - + the system
 - + the environment
 - + the organisation

- + When other organisations have hurt people, the system and the environment all in one go, it has cost \$\$ billions.



Photo credit: Martin Anderson



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OUR APPROACH TO HUMAN FACTORS



Our human factors capability and resources



- + Central HF Team
- + Operations HF Adviser
- + Developments HF Adviser
- + Incident investigators
- + HFAT® trained staff
- + HF focal points

The screenshot shows the Woodside Human Factors website. At the top, there's a navigation bar with "Home", "News and Views", "People and Organization", "Systems and Applications", and "My Connect". Below this is a large banner image of a worker in a hard hat and safety vest, with the text "Human Factors" and a sub-headline: "Using what we know about people, organisations and work design to influence performance. The following are the four work streams to support delivery of our strategic imperative of 'Integrating human factors'".

The main content area is divided into four columns, each representing a key topic:

- 1. Set people up to succeed through good design**
 - Design things so it's easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing and make 'worse' things noticeable
 - Support reliable human performance on critical tasks
 - Consider capabilities, limitations & needs of users
- 2. Ensure human reliability on key tasks**
 - identify critical tasks (e.g. -review licences)
 - identify potential human failures
 - identify what makes these failures more or less likely
 - implement control measures (hierarchy of controls)
- 3. Understand and learn from events (good and bad)**
 - Understand *why* events occur and address issues
 - Don't make the mistakes that others made before
 - implement lessons, don't just share them
 - Understand why we work *successfully*, so we can replicate
- 4. Continue to maintain "Our Safety Culture"**
 - incorporate the framework into everything we do
 - Develop new ways of keeping Our Safety Culture alive
 - Create the environment that underpins the above three work streams

At the bottom of the page, there is a "Welcome" section with a brief introduction and a "Feedback" link. A small profile picture of "Anderson, Martin" is visible.

Approach based around the 10 Key HF topics

Internal resources based around the key topics



Human Factors: Key Topics



“Human factors uses what we know about people, organisations and work design to influence performance”

Introduction to Human Factors

- [Introductory presentation](#)
- [Human Factors brochure](#)
- [E-learning module and Facilitation Guide](#)

| Risk Assessment & Critical Task Analysis | Investigations | Our Safety Culture | Human Factors in Design | Organisational Change | Safety Critical Communications | Procedures |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Critical Task Analysis (CTA) Guideline ➤ Summary of CTA Guideline ➤ CTA Assessment form ➤ Performance Shaping Factors ➤ Risk Assessment Pocket Card ➤ NOPSEMA – Information Paper | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Health Safety and Environment Event Investigation Guideline ➤ Set up to fail? ➤ HFAT® use at Woodside ➤ HFAT® focal points ➤ HFAT® refresher video ➤ HFAT® peer review checklist ➤ NOPSEMA – Information Paper ➤ Taking the First Steps | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ OSC Framework ➤ Introductory video ➤ Manager & Supervisor behaviours ➤ OSC Discussion Cards ➤ Discussion cards – User Guide ➤ OSC Pulse Check poster ➤ Pulse Check Instructions ➤ HSEQ Leadership Field Guide | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Human Factors Engineering Standard ➤ Human Factors Engineering Guideline ➤ Human Factors in Projects Guideline ➤ IOGP – Human Factors Engineering in Projects ➤ NOPSEMA – Information Paper | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Organisational Change Guideline ➤ Assessment templates ➤ Summary of Guideline | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Shift handover guide | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ NOPSEMA – Information Paper |
| Fatigue and Shift-work | Supervision | Staffing | Training & Competence | Mind Traps (Decision Making) | Distractions & interruptions | Maintenance Error |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Fatigue management guideline ➤ Safe Work Australia - Guidance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Worksafe - Guidance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Safe Work Australia - Guidance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Managing Mind Traps Briefing Note ➤ Confirmation Bias Briefing Note ➤ Mind Traps 1-page summary ➤ Situation Awareness 1-page summary ➤ Situation Awareness - Recap & Reset 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note ➤ Distractions 1-page summary ➤ Fatal distraction: Children left in vehicles | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Briefing Note |

Gap analysis against the key topics



| UK HSE top 10 HF topics | | Brief description of topic | Company 1 | Company 2 | Company 3 | Company 4 |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. Managing Human Failures | 1.1 Human Factors in Risk Assessment | Structured inclusion of influences on human failure (violations and errors) in design and risk assessment | Red | Red | Amber | Red |
| | 1.2 Incident investigation | As above for incident investigation | Amber | Amber | Green | Red |
| 2. Procedures | | Providing user-friendly procedures, which support error-free performance | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber |
| 3. Training & Competence | | Ability to undertake responsibilities and perform activities to a recognised standard on a regular basis. It is a combination of skills, experience and knowledge | Amber | Amber | Green | Green |
| 4. Staffing | 4.1 Staffing levels | Right level of skilled people available for task | Amber | Amber | Green | Green |
| | 4.2 Workload | Manageable workload, especially during upsets and emergencies | Red | Amber | Red | Amber |
| | 4.3 Supervision | Experienced supervisors regularly present at work-site | Amber | Amber | Green | Amber |
| | 4.4 Contractors | Competent contractors, properly-supervised | Amber | Amber | Green | Amber |
| 5. Organisational Change | | Human aspects of organisational change risk-assessed and controlled | Amber | Red | Red | Amber |
| 6. Safety-Critical Communications | 6.1 Shift Handover | Structured process for shift and task handover in place and working as intended | Red | Green | Red | Green |
| | 6.2 Permit-To-Work | As above for permit-to-work | Red | Green | Red | Green |
| 7. Human Factors in Design | 7.1 Control Rooms | Ergonomic design principles used | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber |
| | 7.2 Human-Computer Interface | As above | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber |
| | 7.3 Alarm Management | As above, to prevent alarm floods | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber |
| | 7.4 Lighting, Thermal Comfort, Noise & Vibration | As above | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber |
| 8. Fatigue & Shiftwork | | Work patterns designed to prevent / mitigate fatigue, and reduce error | Red | Green | Green | Amber |
| 9. Organisational and Safety Culture | 9.1 Behavioural Safety | Programmes target critical behaviours, and include process & occupational safety | Green | Amber | Green | Green |
| | 9.2 Learning Organisations | Chronic unease exists, always looking for system causes of failures, and opportunities to learn or improve | Amber | Amber | Amber | Green |
| 10. Maintenance, Inspection & Testing | 10.1 Maintenance Error | Structured process to minimise such errors in place – coupled with widespread awareness of risk of maintenance error | Red | Amber | Red | Amber |
| | 10.2 Intelligent Customers | The capability of the organization to have a clear understanding and knowledge of the product or service being supplied. Relevant to use of contractors. | Red | Amber | Green | Amber |

Gap analysis findings: Fictitious data

1

Set people up to succeed through good design

- ✓ Design things so it's easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing (and make 'wrong' things noticeable)
- ✓ Ensure our 'end-users' are involved in design
- ✓ Consider capabilities, limitations & needs of users

2

Ensure human reliability on critical tasks

- ✓ Identify critical tasks in your business area
- ✓ Understand the potential for human failure in these tasks and the conditions or influences that make them more likely
- ✓ Implement control measures (using the hierarchy of control)

3

Understand and learn from events (good and bad)

- ✓ Seek to understand how and why something went wrong
- ✓ Report and discuss errors, and understand the conditions that make errors more likely
- ✓ Understand why we were successful, so we can replicate success

4

Continue to maintain "Our Safety Culture"

- ✓ Engage people using the Discussion Cards
- ✓ Understand key behaviours in investigations
- ✓ Incorporate the framework into everything we do
- ✓ Create the environment that underpins the above key areas

1

Set people up to succeed through good design

- ✓ Design things so it's easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing (and make 'wrong' things noticeable)
- ✓ Ensure our 'end-users' are involved in design
- ✓ Consider capabilities, limitations & needs of users

Also known as **Human Factors Engineering:**

“Designing plant, processes and systems in a way that optimises the human contribution”



Photo credits: Martin Anderson

- + Misfuelling costs Australian motorists \$10 million each year
- + Average repair costs \$7000
- + The solution:
 - + tell people not to do it?
 - + standardise the pump colour coding?
 - + segregation of fuel pumps?
 - + warning sticker on fuel cap?
- + Engineering solutions are more robust:
 - + Assume people will pick the wrong pump
 - + Make it physically impossible to misfuel



2

Ensure human reliability on critical tasks

- ✓ Identify critical tasks in your business area
- ✓ Understand the potential for human failure in these tasks and the conditions or influences that make them more likely
- ✓ Implement control measures (using the hierarchy of control)

- + Traditionally, we consider how the system can harm the person
- + We need to also consider the opposite:
 - **What can the person do (or not do) that could harm the system?**
- + This involves proactively identifying and managing potential human performance issues on critical tasks

“Identification of critical human tasks should be the first step for organisations seeking to improve their control of error risk” (NOPSEMA, 2015, N-06300-IP1509)

“members should work towards adopting practices to identify and understand safety-critical human tasks. They should also work on the operational and management practices that need to be in place to ensure operators are able to perform these tasks reliably”, (IOGP, Report 460, July 2012)

Critical Task Analysis: Human factors risk assessment



Identify tasks that are critical

Prioritise the list of critical tasks

Understand & describe the tasks

Identify what could go wrong - and why

Determine and implement measures to improve human performance


- Focus on tasks that can result in serious consequences and are vulnerable to human performance issues.
- Aim for 20% of tasks to be rated as High.
- Walk-through and Talk-through in the workplace. What and who do people interact with? What information do they need? What documents are used?
- Consider unintentional and deliberate failures. Identify the relevant Performance Shaping Factors (the context in which behaviour occurs).
- What makes the task or system 'error resistant' and 'error tolerant'? Identify measures that will prevent human performance issues; as well as measures that will increase recovery.

3

Understand and learn from events (good and bad)

- ✓ Seek to understand how and why something went wrong
- ✓ Report and discuss errors, and understand the conditions that make errors more likely
- ✓ Understand why we were successful, so we can replicate success

- + Investigator non-technical skills
- + Learning lessons
- + Links to non-HSE events
- + Incorporating the HFAT® approach
- + Investigating successes




When a flower doesn't bloom you fix the environment in which it grows, not the flower

Alexander Den Heijer

Photo credit: Martin Anderson

Investigation approach



Maintaining Our Safety Culture



4

Continue to maintain “Our Safety Culture”

- ✓ Engage people using the Discussion Cards
- ✓ Understand key behaviours in investigations
- ✓ Incorporate the framework into everything we do
- ✓ Create the environment that underpins the above key areas

| Theme | Everyone | Supervisors | Managers/Executives |
|-----------------|--------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Standards | Follow rules | Ensure compliance | Set high standards |
| Communication | Speak up | Encourage the team | Communicate openly |
| Risk management | Be mindful | Promote risk awareness | Confront risk |
| Involvement | Get involved | Involve the team | Involve the workforce |


“Our Safety Culture” Framework



Photo credit: Martin Anderson

Our Safety Culture Discussion Cards

Assessing Our Safety Culture





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